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THE POWELLIAN VIRTUES IN A POLARIZED AGE
J. HARvm WILKNSON III*
The American legal culture is profoundly polarized today. This polari-
zation extends to the very nature of law. The traditional view of how the
legal system does and should function has broken down. Ours is an age
which is skeptical of all authority, and that includes the authority of the
law. The sense of estrangement from social institutions does not exempt
the courts. Indeed, there are those who view the application of law as
nothing more than an act of human preference and will-in other words,
merely as a form of politics. Unavailable and incomprehensible to the
dispossessed, the law symbolizes, to the indeterminists, nothing more than
the subjective preferences of those in positions of bower. In their view, the
legal culture perpetuates the oppressive divisions inherent in American
society-divisions primarily along the lines of race, class, gender, ethnicity,
and the like.
This perception is vigorously opposed by those who insist that the rule
of law embodies an objective component, that relativism seems little more
than a pathway to confusion, and that indeterminacy portends the demise
of the social contract. The dominant view in our legal culture remains that
some answers and some reasoning are objectively "better," in a legal sense,
than other answers and reasoning. Lawyers might disagree, sometimes quite
vociferously, about which is better, but the majority of lawyers rejects the
belief that equally plausible legal arguments can always be made for any
position.
Not only is the nature of law the subject of strenuous debate. The
polarization and politicization of our legal culture is reflected in several
other ways. Perhaps the best example is the increasing hostility of confir-
mation hearings on the president's nominees to the Supreme Court. Deep
differences in society over such issues as affirmative action and abortion
have led to fights characterized by nothing so much as an absence of
restraint. During the nomination battles over Robert Bork and Clarence
Thomas, the instrumentalities of modern mass political action and com-
munication were used by opponents and supporters alike-tools such as
thirty-second television ads, bumper stickers and buttons, and detailed
personal exposes involving everything from which church the nominee
attends to the life history of the nominee's spouse and even to what movies
the nominee rents from his local video store. Such trivialization of the
judicial confirmation process ironically reflects the frantic perception of
high stakes-stakes that have inevitably risen with the transfer of more and
more political business into the courts.
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Polarization of the legal culture can also be seen at the nation's law
schools. Tenure decisions-the academic analogue of confirmation hear-
ings-are alleged to turn at some schools on a professor's perceived alle-
giance to one school of thought rather than another. Polarization has
unfortunately filtered down to some student bodies as well. The absence of
consensus on fundamental assumptions of the legal culture-or even on the
need for consensus itself-has in turn endangered the basic elements of
civility. Discussions both inside and outside of classrooms may resemble
shouting matches with little meaningful intellectual exchange or thoughtful
re-examination of assumptions.
Finally, I do not exempt lawyers or judges from this general polarizing
trend. Trust within the legal profession is not what it once was. The maxim
that the worthiest of adversaries in court are the warmest of friends outside
of court may not be so true anymore. The debate between judges is
conducted at a high decibel level also, and the need to depersonalize all
judicial disagreements must be kept continually in mind.
I mention all these things because they may help us to recognize what
a treasure we have in Justice Lewis Powell. I can think of no one who has
worked harder to ease rather than exacerbate tensions in our society. His
demeanor suggests open-mindedness and compromise. His has not been the
harsh voice of a harangue, but the soft voice of persuasion. He has listened
to litigants, not lectured them. He has been considerate to colleagues. He
has treated both people and their points of view with consummate respect.
He has not washed his hands of the difficult disputes, but he has viewed
the ultimate role of the judiciary in our society as that of mediator and
facilitator, not as dictator. Under Justice Powell's approach, in sum, judges
play an important role-albeit, in the final analysis, a limited one-in
contributing to consensus both within our body politic and our legal culture.
I ask you to contemplate how Justice Powell's personal characteristics
manifested themselves in his jurisprudence. First, the tool that perhaps most
clearly distinguishes Powellian jurisprudence from that of the Left and the
Right is balancing: the Justice disfavored bright-line rules and instead
preferred constitutional dispositions that weighed very carefully the private
and governmental interests at stake. Second, Justice Powell often sought to
frame rulings narrowly and to base a decision only upon those principles
that were essential to the decision. Third, and closely related to the second,
he wanted the facts. As a former practitioner and litigator, he was conscious
of the importance of facts; he relished the facts; he placed stock in them.
The rule of decision was strictly based on the facts of the case then before
the Court, with the results of cases with differing facts left for the future.
All of these rules functioned to maintain the essentially incremental nature
of adjudication, which allowed continuous calibration and re-evaluation of
existing doctrine by a Court functioning in a traditional common-law
fashion.
A fourth characteristic of Powellian jurisprudence is Solomonic results.
He has been a judge who made litigants feel they should have settled the
case. He often eschewed decisions that wholly rejected or wholly accepted
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the philosophical positions advanced by the parties. Instead, he sought to
craft decisions that gave something to both sides, that recognized candidly
the closeness of the case, that honored the legitimacy of two opposing
positions and that sought to ensure that the adjudicatory losers did not
leave court feeling disenfranchised and abandoned by the legal system.
Fifth, and finally, Powellian jurisprudence treated legal principles not
as hard and fast rules but, rather, as presumptions that could be rebutted
in an appropriate case. In this way, judicially crafted rules functioned to
guide judges but not to blind them.
Now, any significant figure will be subject to criticism, and Justice
Powell has had his share. Many wished Justice Powell would become an
unabashed partisan-mind you, for their own point of view. Many recog-
nized his stature and sought, unsuccessfully, to turn it to their purposes.
The Powell approach was also criticized for providing insufficient guidance
to the lower courts, and for a lack of predictability which bred litigiousness
in a society already too prone to resort-to litigation.
What has been overlooked in recent years, however, are the advantages
of the Powellian approach. It is sometimes claimed on behalf of bright-line
rules that they reduce the impulse inherent in judges to decide cases based
on their own personal Policy preferences by committing the judge to an
indisputable principle of law. Yet bright-line rules, valuable though they
may be, do not hold all the answers. Trial courts are naturally uneasy with
hard-and-fast rules that are dictated by appellate courts and that seem to
tolerate grave injustice in individual cases, even if such cases are a minority.
And the injustice created in particular cases by a bright-line rule is likely
to mark it as a target for judicial erosion or overruling when, over time,
the judicial philosophy of the Court evolves. Over the long haul, greater
stability may be engendered by presumptive standards over which competing
viewpoints can struggle for emphasis, rather than by hard-and-fast principles
which admit of no exception.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Powellian approach, however,
is its emphasis on the judicial role in facilitating the development of
consensus over potentially divisive social issues. Our history is, unfortu-
nately, replete with judicial attempts to preempt social conflict through
constitutional decree-attempts that have all too often aggravated such
conflict rather than ameliorated it. The Powell approach sought to ensure
that the most volatile issues in our society did not quickly achieve definitive
outcomes in the courts. He wished both to leave open the channels of
judicial debate and to ensure that the "losers" in court (if they so recognized
themselves) took not to the streets but rather to the voting booths and to
the legislatures.
It has been customary to speak of our "social fabric" and "our sense
of community"-in fact, such expressions have become almost a clich6.
But a fabric is made of interwoven strands, and our legal culture today is
in danger of unravelling. There has never been a time when the legal
profession was in greater need of Lewis Powells. There is a temptation now
to think of hostility as the norm and of civility as a bygone thing. Justice
19921
274 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:271
Powell's career will always call upon lawyers to seek common ground. So
what shall we make of his distinguished example? Will we view it as the
inspiration for a stronger legal order, or treat it merely as an occasion for
nostalgia? I do not think of Justice Powell as the last great conciliator, but
as a prophet of mutual respect and understanding. His is a healing example,
if we can but heed it.
